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Potential Income Effects of the 
Harkin-Gephardt Proposal on New 
York Dairy Farms 
Harry M. Kaiser, Edward H. Heslop, and Robert A. Milligan 
This article reports the results of research regarding the farm-level implications for New York dairy producers 
of national mandatory supply control programs for feed grains and milk. The analysis is based on the proposed 
Harkin-Gephardt Bill which would authorize a mandatory supply control program for milk and the major 
supported crops. Representative farm budgets were constructed for a sample of dairy farms to assess the 
possible effects on costs and returns. Some farmers would gain, while others would not. The results suggest 
that dairy farmers who purchase all of their feed would be worse off, while farmers who grow grain would be 
better off under the proposed supply control program. 
Introduction 
Mandatory supply controls have been used in the 
past for some U.S. agricultural commodities but 
have never been implemented for the dairy industry. 
However, over the last two years there has been a 
renewed interest in this type of program for dairy 
policy. Advocates (e.g., the Family Farm Alliance) 
claim that mandatory production controls would 
reduce the large surpluses of milk acquired by the 
government in recent years at support prices 
mandated by Congress. It is also argued that such a 
policy would eliminate the problems of declining 
milk prices and income and equity erosion expe-
rienced by many farm businesses. A bill authorizing 
a mandatory supply control program for milk and 
other agricultural commodities has been introduced 
by Senator Harkin (D, Iowa) and Representative 
Gephardt (D, Missouri). The Harkin-Gephardt 
proposal, if enacted and implemented following 
producer approval in a referendum, would have 
significant ramifications for dairy farmers. 
Several recent studies have considered the im-
plications such a policy would have on the dairy 
industry. Research by Nott and Hamm, Mason, 
Kaiser, and Jesse and Cropp has focused on more 
qualitative dimensions of mandatory supply control 
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programs, providing valuable information on al-
ternative types of policies, experiences from other 
countries (e.g., Canada and the European Com-
munity), and analyses of the ramifications man-
datory programs would have at the farm level. There 
have also been several economic analyses of the 
Harkin-Gephardt proposal (see, for example, studies 
by the Food and Agricultural Policy Research 
Institute and the Agricultural and Food Policy Center). 
Each examined differences between the Harkin-
Gephardt Bill and existing programs with respect to 
their impacts on aggregate net farm income, prices, 
production, consumer demand, government 
purchases and costs for the major agricultural com-
modities produced in the U.S. These studies have 
predicted that this bill would result in significant 
changes in dairy markets if implemented. The general 
changes include an increase in aggregate net farm 
income and prices and decreases in production, 
consumption, and government purchases of 
commodities. While insight has been gained on the 
general effects of mandatory production controls, 
with the exception of these two macroeconomic 
studies, specific estimates of farm prices, costs, and 
incomes are not available. Moreover, previous 
research provides little information on the micro-
level ramifications of the Harkin-Gephardt Bill. 
In this article, the farm-level implications of 
mandatory supply control on dairy farm prices, 
costs, and incomes are explored. There are two 
specific objectives of this paper. The first objective is 
to ascertain whether New York dairy producers 74     October 1987 
would be better or worse off under the Harkin-
Gephardt Bill relative to current dairy programs in 
terms of net income. The second objective is to 
determine to what extent the distribution of net 
benefits of the Harkin-Gephardt Bill relative to ex-
isting programs differs by farm resource charac-
teristics . To address these two objectives, 
representative farms are constructed from dairy farm 
business summary data in order to estimate net 
incomes for two scenarios. Under the base scenario, 
net incomes are calculated using actual 1986 data 
from the Summary. In the second scenario, net 
incomes are estimated assuming that the supply 
control and price provisions of the Harkin-Gephardt 
Bill were operational in 1986. 
Provisions of the Harkin-Gephardt Bill 
The Harkin-Gephardt or "Family Farm" Bill was 
introduced into Congress in the fall of 1986 as an 
alternative to the Food Security Act of 1985. Ad-
vocates contend that this Bill is a better policy 
option than the 1985 Farm Act because it would 
result in price and income protection for ''family 
farmers" while simultaneously reducing the bur-
geoning public costs of farm programs. The bill 
attempts to achieve its policy objectives through (1) 
authorizing a mandatory supply control (marketing 
quota) program, and (2) significantly raising support 
prices for selected crops and milk. If passed by 
Congress and signed by the President, producers 
would vote in a special referendum to approve or 
reject the program. According to the Bill, a simple 
majority of over 50 percent would be required for 
implementation. 
The current milk surplus problem would be ad-
dressed by the Family Farm Bill through imple-
menting a National Milk Marketing Base Program. 
This program is designed to limit total marketings to 
total commercial demand for milk and dairy 
products. Two types of adjustments in milk mar-
ketings would be required by this program. The first 
adjustment is specific to each farm. Each producer 
would be assigned a permanent base or Milk 
Marketing History, which is equal to the farmer's 
average annual milk marketings for 1981—85, after 
deleting the highest and lowest marketing years in 
this period.
1 
1 Milk Marketing Histories for producers that did not sell milk in each of 
these five years would be equal to the annual average of years that they did 
deliver milk. These histories for farmers that participated in the 1984-85 
Milk Diversion Program would be equal to the base established under the 
program, i.e., 1981-82. Finally, for producers that sold milk in only one of 
these five years the Secretary of Agriculture is given the discretion to 
determine a "reasonable" MMH for them. 
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The second adjustment would be uniformly ap-
plied to all farms based on estimates of national 
milk use relative to production. For each year the 
program is in effect, the Secretary of Agriculture 
would estimate a Milk Marketing Allocation Factor, 
which is equal to projected national commercial 
disappearance plus exports, divided by estimated total 
production. The Secretary would use these two 
adjustments in calculating each producer's Milk 
Marketing Bases, which is the quantity of milk 
each farmer could sell without being penalized. 
Each producer's annual base would be determined 
by the following formula: 
(1)        MMB  - 99%  x  MMH  x MMAF 
where:       MMB   = Milk Marketing Base; 
MMH     = Milk Marketing History; 
MMAF   = Milk  Marketing  Allocation  
                   Factor. 
In return for these reductions in milk marketings, 
the price of milk sold within one's base would be 
supported at levels significantly higher than the 
current dairy support price. Beginning in calendar 
year 1988, the support price for 3.67% (butterfat) 
milk would be set at 70 percent of parity and would 
be increased 1 percentage point each year until it 
reached a maximum of 80 percent of parity in 1998. 
All crops covered by this Bill would also be sup-
ported at these parity percentages. 
Any milk sold over one's base would be subject 
to a price penalty in order to discourage excess 
milk marketings. As currently written, the penalty 
on over-base milk would be equal to 75 percent of 
the price support.
2 
The Model and Data 
If the provisions of the Family Farm Bill were 
implemented, there would be several benefits and 
costs to dairy farmers compared to the current dairy 
programs. The main benefit would be higher farm 
prices due to the increase in the support price for 
milk. Assuming that the support price for 3.67 
percent (butterfat) milk were set at 70 percent of 
parity, producers would have received $15.00 per 
hundredweight in 1986 rather than Sll.60.
3 The 
2 For a more detailed description of all the provisions in the HG Bill, see 
Kaiser and Heslop. 
3The $ 15.00 per hundredweight estimate of the price support for milk at 
70 percent of parity for 1986 is based on 70% of the parity equivalent for 
manufacturing grade milk in 1986 reported in Dairy Situation and Outlook 
Report, April 1987. This is very close to the estimate used for 1987 in the 
study by the Agricultural and Food Policy Center ($15.02) but much lower 
than the estimate used in the Food and Agricultural Policy Research 
Institute study for 1987 ($16.95). While the latter study Kaiser. Heslop, and Milligan  Income Effects of the Harkin-Gephardt Proposal    75 
Table 1.    Profiles of the Three Representative Farms. 
        Resource Classification     
Item    Average Farm Forage Only Some Grain  All Grain 


















Average Cow Numbers    90    75   98    93







  132 
 
  180 
 
  172 
 
Milk Marketings (10,000 Ibs)    140.6   114.8   156.6    147.5
Marketings/Cow ( 1 ,000 Ibs)    15.6    15.3   16.0    15.9
Crop Acreage                 
Corn Silage    68    60   73    53
Hay    142    120   156    153
Com Grain    32    0   72    124
Other Grain    37    0   18    37
    279    180   319    367 Total   
main costs to producers are foregone income due 
to cutbacks in milk marketings and increased feed 
costs since the Bill would also support crop prices 
at 70 percent of parity. This second cost would 
have differential impacts on producers depending 
upon the quantity and quality of their soil resources. 
Construction of Representative Farms 
Four representative farms were constructed from the 
1986 Cornell Dairy Farm Business Summary 
records. The first farm was based on average values 
from all farms in the summary. This farm, which is 
referred to as the "Average" farm, was used to 
determine whether New York producers, as a whole, 
would be better or worse off under the Harkin-
Gephardt Bill relative to existing programs. The 
remaining three representative farms were denned in 
terms of feed supply characteristics, based on the 
following definitions used by Kalter, et al. For all 
three situations it was assumed that the farms grew 
all forage necessary to meet animal needs. In the 
first case, the resource situation consisted of 
did not explain how this figure was calculated, it probably reflects the 
higher grain costs under the Harkin-Gephardt Bill. However, if the pro-
visions of this bill were enacted today, the 70% of parity estimate used in 
this study would be more appropriate than the $16.95 estimate because the 
formula for determining parity uses the previous 10 years of prices paid 
and received. Another possible explanation for the latter study's $16.95 
estimate is it may be based on the All Milk Price parity equivalent, which is 
not appropriate since the dairy support price applies to manu-facturine 
erade mttk. not all milk. 
farms that purchased all their corn grain (Forage 
Only case). The second resource situation, the Some 
Grain case, included farms which grew some, but 
not all, of the corn grain for their own usage. The 
last recourse situation, the AH Grain case, consisted 
of farms that had excess corn grain for sale. The 
representative farm budgets were based on average 
values from the farm business summaries for all 
farms belonging to each resource category. Profiles 
of these farms are presented in Table 1. Although 
based on New York data, these farms are thought to 
represent most of the dairy farm situations 
prevailing in the Northeast (Kalter, et al.). 
The Base and Harkin-Gephardt Scenarios 
For each representative farm, net income was es-
timated under two scenarios for 1986.
4 In the first 
situation, the base scenario, net income was cal-
culated based on support prices mandated in the 
Food Security Act. In the second scenario, the Har-
kin-Gephardt (HG) scenario, net income was es-
timated assuming the supply control and pricing 
provisions of this Bill were implemented. Net in-
come for the HG scenario was first calculated for 
four levels of reductions from 1986 marketings. 
This was done because the level of reductions would 
depend, in large part, on each producer's current 
milk marketings relative to her or his base mar-
ketings and hence difficult to generalize. The four 
4 Net income, in this study, is defined as total farm receipts less 
operating expenses, interest, and depreciation.  
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Table 2.     Net Income Estimation Procedures Under the SFFB With Reductions in Cow 
Numbers (Case 1) 
      Harkin-Gephardt Scenario 
--- RFAM ----
    Base Scenario    0%    5%     10%     15%    20%    25%    3% 
Receipts         
Milk Sales    MP86*MM86 MPHG*MM86* (1   - RFAM) 
Dairy Cattle         
Sales Ave From Records BS* (1 - RFAM / .85)
Calve Sales    Ave From Records BS* (1   - RFAM / .85} 
Other Livestock Sales    Ave From Records BS* (1   - RFAM / .85) 















   
Labor    Ave From Records BS* (1   - RFAM / .85) 
Feed     
Grain Ave From Records BS* (1 - RFAM / .85) *2.29
      or BS - ( ACG* ( 1 - (RFAM/ .85)) *YLD*Pc***
Other    Ave From Records BS* (1   -  RFAM / .85) 
Machinery    Ave From Records   BS* [1   -  %RAP] 
Livestock    Ave From Records BS* (1   - RFAM / .85) 
Milk Marketing    Ave From Records BS* (1   -  %RMM) 
Crop    Ave From Records BS* (1   -  %RAP) 
Real Estate    Ave From Records Same As BS
Other    Ave From Records   BS* (I   -  RFAM / .85) 
Interest    Ave From Records IR* (DB -  CCS)
Depreciation    Ave From Records   Same as BS
Where: 
MP86 =  State average milk (blend) price received in 1986; 
MM86 = Total milk marketings in 1986; 
MPHG  =  Projected milk price in 1986 (70% parity); 
RFAM = Reduction from actual 1986 marketings, 0% ...  30%; 
BS =  Base Scenario Value; 
ACG =  Acres of com grain; 
YLD = Corn grain yield per acre; 
PC = Corn meal price/ton ($164.00) 
%RAP =  Percentage reduction in acres planted; 
%RMM =  Percentage reduction in milk marketed; 
IR = Interest rate; 
DB =  Base scenario debt level; 
CCS, = Proceeds from livestock sales applied to debt. 
*This formula applies to Forage Only and Some Grain farms. 
**This formula applies to All Grain farms. 
***This formula applies to Some Grain farms only. 
reductions from actual 1986 milk marketings (here-
after referred to as RFAM) included 0%, 10%, 20%, 
and 30%. An estimated reduction level, based on 
national data for 1986, was also used to compare 
incomes under the two scenarios. It was assumed that 
there would be no excess milk marketings by the 
three farms above their bases and therefore no 
penalty payments. 
Net Income Estimation 
Net income in the base scenario was calculated as 
follows. Milk sales were determined by the product 
of the 1986 state average blend price
5 ($12.09) times 
average milk marketings for each representative 
farm. Other farm receipts and all costs were based on 
average values from individual records 
5 The blend price is the minimum price that handlers of Grade A milk 
(eligible for fluid products) must pay to farmers within a milk marketing 
order. This price is an average of Class I (fluid products) and Class II 
(manufactured products) minimum prices, weighted by marketwide fluid 
and non-fluid utilization rates, respectively. The milk price support is 
indirectly related to the blend price because the support price attempts to 
establish a floor on Grade B milk (only eligible for manufactured products) 
prices. Since Class I and II prices are based on manufacturing prices in 
Minnesota and Wisconsin, the blend price is strongly influenced by the milk 
price support. Kaiser, Heslop, and Milligan  Income Effects of the Harkin-Gepliardt Proposal     77 
Table 3.    Net Income Estimation Procedures Under the SFFB With Reductions in Milk ivlarketings 
Per Cow (Case 2)___________________________________________ 
      Harkin-Gephardt Scenario
  -     -     -        RFAM        -     -     -     -
  Base Scenario   0%     5%     10%     15%     20%     25%     30%
Receipts       
Milk Sales  MP86*MM86 MPHG*MM86* (1  -  RFAM)
Dairy Cattle       
Sales  Ave From Records Same as BS* 
Calve Sales  Ave From Records Same as BS* 
Other Livestock Sales  Ave From Records Same as BS* 
Crop Sales  Ave From Records Same as BS* 
Misc Income 
 




     
Labor  Ave From Records   Same as BS 
Feed
Grain  Ave From Records BS*RGCLP*2.29
Other  Ave From Records   Same as BS 
Machinery  Ave From Records Same as BS 
Livestock  Ave From Records Same as BS 
MilkMarketing Ave From Records BS* (1 - %RMM)
Crop  Ave From Records   Same as BS 
Real Estate  Ave From Records Same as BS 
Other  Ave From Records Same as BS 
Interest  Ave From Records   Same as BS 
Depreciation  Ave From Records   Same as BS 
Where: 
MP86 = State average milk (blend) price received in 1986; 
MM86 = Total milk marketings in 1986; 
MPHG = Projected milk price in 1986 (70% parity); 
RFAM = Reduction from actual 1986 marketings, 0% . . .  30%; 
BS  = Base Scenario Value; 
RGCLP = Percentage reduction between BS and linear programming feed costs (see text); 
%RMM = Percentage reduction in milk marketed; 
*This formula applies to Forage Only and Some Grain farms.    
**This formula applies to All Grain farms. 
for each group. In addition to milk sales, other 
farm receipts included dairy cattle and calf sales, 
other livestock sales, crop sales, and miscellaneous 
income. Operating expenses included labor, feed, 
machinery, livestock, crop, real estate, and other 
expenses. Fixed costs consisted of interest pay
ments and depreciation. 
-                                      t = 1965 to 1986 
Net income in the Harkin-Gephardt scenario was 
estimated using the following procedures and as-
sumptions (see Tables 2 and 3). To calculate the 
New York blend price given a 70 percent of parity 
milk support price, the following equation was es-
timated using ordinary least squares:
6 
(2)     BPt -   -1.555 +  0.949 PSt + 0.067 Ut 
(-5.8)        (12.9)  (1.5) 
R-Square - 0.989 
6  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  All coefficients were sig-
nificantly different from zero at the 10% significant level. 
where:    BPt =  Blend price, year t;  
                PSt =  Price support, year t;  
                  Ut = Class I utilization, New York-New   
                            Jersey Milk Marketing Order, year      
                            t;    
The 1986 price support level under the HG Bill and 
Class I utilization rates for New York were 
substituted into equation (2) to estimate milk prices 
for the HG scenario (data obtained from Federal 
Order #2). The estimated blend price was $15.36 
per hundredweight.
7 Milk sales were then deter-
mined by the product of the blend price times av-
erage milk marketings under each RFAM. 
7 An alternative way of estimating the Harkin-Gephardt blend price for 
New York is to take the difference between the actual support price in 1986 
($11.60) and the 70% parity equivalent for ($15.00) and add it to the 1986 
average blend price ($12.09). This method results in a blend price equal to 
$15.49, which is quite close to the $15.36 estimate derived from equation 
(2). 78     October 1987 
Changes in the remaining receipts and in all costs 
under the Harkin-Gephardt Bill would depend upon 
the manner in which producers would satisfy their 
reductions in milk marketings. For example, costs 
and other farm receipts would be different if farmers 
made these reductions through culling dairy cattle 
rather than by using management strategies that 
reduce marketings per cow. Consequently, two 
alternative strategies were modeled for reducing 
milk marketings for each of the four RFAM levels. 
Under the first case (Case 1), it was assumed that 
the reductions in milk marketings were achieved 
through reducing cow numbers. In the second case 
(Case 2), reductions in milk marketings were as-
sumed to be made through reducing marketings per 
cow. 
Other Receipts and Costs (Case I ) .  To accom-
plish the reduction in milk marketings in Case 1, it 
was assumed that producers reduced herd inventory 
by culling their lowest producing cow and 
proportional youngstock inventories. The percent-
age reduction in herd size was 1.176 greater than 
the required percentage reduction in milk market-
ings because lower than average producing animals 
would be culled (Oltenacu). 
Revenue from dairy cattle, calves, and other 
livestock sales were equal to base scenario levels 
reduced by the percentage decrease in cow numbers 
required to satisfy reductions in milk marketings 
for each RFAM. Revenue from crop sales for the 
Average, Forage Only, and Some Grain farms was 
assumed to be identical to the base scenario, as 
these sales are generally excess roughage. How-
ever, crop sales for the All Grain farm were ad-
justed in the following fashion. It was assumed that 
this farm was in the Feed Grain Program and the 
maximum acreage reduction (35%) was in effect. 
The farmer then received 70 percent of the corn 
parity price ($3.44 per bushel) on all corn sales, 
given the 35 percent cutback. Finally, miscella-
neous income for all three farms was assumed to 
be the same as in the base scenario for all levels of 
RFAM. 
Operating expenses in this case were as follows. 
Hired labor costs were decreased by the reduction 
in dairy cattle. In calculating feed costs, first the 
amount of grain for feeding requirements was re-
duced proportionately to the reduction in dairy an-
imals. For the Forage Only and All Grain farms, 
the amount of concentrate remaining to be pur-
chased after the reduction was multiplied by the 
ratio of corn and soybean prices set at 70 percent 
of parity to their actual prices in 1986, which was 
equal to 2.29. For the Average, and Some Grain 
farms, the corn grain acreage was allowed to re-
main at the same level, adjusting grain purchases 
downward to reflect the increased per cow contri- 
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bution of home grown grains. A second version of 
Case 1 for the Some Grain farm was also consid-
ered. In this version, it was assumed that the Some 
Grain farm could use idle forage acres to grow 
additional grain. Roughage and other feed costs 
were reduced by the same percentage used in cow 
number reductions for each RFAM. Machinery costi 
were reduced by the percentage reduction in acres 
planted. It was assumed that the unutilized roughage 
acres on the Average, Forage Only, and Some 
Grain farms were idled. For the All Grain farm 
roughage acreage was reduced according to the 
percentage decrease in cow numbers while grain 
acreage was decreased by the 35 percent require-
ment of the acreage reduction program. All live-
stock costs, except milk marketing, were reduced 
by the same percentage as cow numbers for each 
RFAM. Milk marketing costs were adjusted by the 
corresponding change in milk sales for each RFAM. 
All crop expenses were adjusted using identical 
procedures employed in adjusting machinery costs. 
Real estate costs were assumed to be the same for 
all scenarios. Finally, other operating costs were 
reduced by the same percentage applied to cow 
numbers. 
Proceeds from the sale of the excess dairy cattle 
required to meet the marketing reductions were 
applied to reduce debt. Hence, interest costs for 
each RFAM greater than 0 percent fell according 
to the debt remaining after this sale. The value of 
the culled cows and heifers was based on the New 
York average slaughter price for 1986, $33.71 per 
hundredweight (New York Economic Handbook, 
1987). Depreciation costs were assumed to be the 
same in all scenarios. 
Other Receipts and Costs (Case 2). To accom-
plish the reduction in milk marketings in Case 2, it 
was assumed that producers reduced marketings per 
cow instead of cow numbers. In this case, the results 
should reflect an increase in the use of forage and a 
decrease in the use of grain so that feed costs are 
minimized. All receipts and costs, except milk sales 
receipts and grain costs, were assumed to be the 
same as those in the base scenario. 
The grain costs in Case 2 were determined using a 
linear programming model that minimized the feed 
costs to meet the nutrient demand for the dairy herd. 
The program balanced crude protein, net energy-
lactation, acid detergent fiber, and dry matter intake 
demands by allocating feeds to early lactation (91.5 
days), mid lactation (122 days), late lactation (91.5 
days), dry cows (60 days), and replacement heifers. 
The change in feed requirements was calculated by 
first determining feed needs, holding the ratio of hay 
to corn silage acres constant and assuming no 
additional acres could enter the solution. Feed needs 
were then determined for 10 Kaiser, Heslop. ami Miliigan  Income Effects of the Harkin-Gephardt Proposal     79 
Table 4.     Abbreviated Income Statements for the Average Farm, Base and Harkin-Gephardt 
Scenarios, Cases 1 and 2.   
      - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - - --  Harkin-Gephardt Scenario  - - - - -- - - - -- - - - -- - - 
  Base  -------------- ---------- R F A M   -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  ----- ---------- ----
Income Statement/Case  Scenario  0%> 10% 20%  30%





247,107 223,350 199,593 
 
175,836
Milk Sales  169,987  215,895 194,305 172,716  1 5 1 , 1 26
Operating Costs  146,587  197,297 176,793 156,290  135,787





9,275 6,379 3,482 
 
585
% Change From Base Scenario    -24% -47% -71%  -95%
Net Income Per Cow  135  103 80 51  10










Milk Sales  169,987    194,305 172,716   
Operating Costs  146,587    139,295 124,287   










% Change From Base Scenario  273% 222% 
Net Income Per Cow  135    575 573   
*Net Income is defined as total receipts minus operating costs minus interest and depreciation. 
and 20 percent reductions in marketings and there-
fore herd averages. Again, it was assumed that no 
additional acreage could enter the solution. Finally, 
the resulting costs were multiplied by 2.29, i.e., 
the increase in grain prices under the Harkin-Ge-
phardt Bill. The 10 and 20 percent RFAMs were 
selected for Case 2 analysis since the national av-
erage reduction was projected to fall within this 
range. 
It is important to note that Cases 1 and 2 rep-
resent the extremes of how producers would re-
spond to supply control. Actual changes would 
probably lie somewhere between the two estimates 
of net income. Most farmers would likely use a 
combination of reduction in cow numbers and mar-
ketings per cow. 
Results 
The abbreviated income statements for the four 
representative farms for all scenarios are presented in 
Tables 4, 5,6, and7.
8 The results for the average 
8 The complete income statements for the three representative farms for 
all scenarios may be obtained from the authors. Alternatively, the income 
of all farms were inconclusive with respect to Case 1 
and 2 reduction strategies. Using the Case 1 re-
duction strategy, the Average farm was worse off at 
all RFAMs in the HG scenario relative to the base 
scenario. HG net income ranged from 24 to 95% 
lower than actual 1986 income. On the other hand, 
HG income was significantly higher than base 
scenario income under Case 2 reduction strategies. 
At the 10 and 20% RFAM, net income more than 
doubled in the HG scenario. Consequently, it would 
appear that the method of reducing milk marketings 
is a critical factor in determining whether New York 
dairy farmers as a whole would gain or lose from the 
Harkin-Gephardt proposal. 
The net income for the Forage Only farm was 
lower under the HG Bill than under existing policy. 
In Case 1, the percentage decline in net incomes in 
the HG scenario ranged from 58% for the 0 percent 
RFAM to 77% lower for the 30 percent RFAM 
(Table 4). In Case 2, HG net income was lower for 
some situations and higher for others. For example, 
net income was 9% lower for a 10% reduction, but 
8% higher for a 20% reduction in milk marketings. 
The major reason for these results was the higher 
cost of grain and concentrate. Grain and concentrate 
costs more than doubled in the HG situation. Grain 
and concentrate costs on average represented about80    October 1987  NJARE 
Table 5.    Abbreviated Income Statements for the Forage Only Farm, Base and Harkin- 
Gephardt Scenarios, Cases 1 and 2. 
    - - - -- - - -- - - -- - - -- - - -- - - --  Harkin-Gephardt Scenario  - - - -- - - -- - - -- - -
  Base  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  R F A M   -  -  -  - -  --- ---- ---- ---- ----
Income Statement/Case  Scenario  0%   10%                           20%  30%
Case 1 Reduction Scenario 
 
         
Total Receipts  166,780  206,174   185,824                    165,474  145,123





168,266   149,378                     130,490 
 
1 1 1 ,602
Grain + Concentrate  40,787  91,704   80,915                      70,127  59,338
Net Income*  19,935  8,412   7,171                         5,930  4,688
% Change From Base Scenario    -58% - 64%                       - 70%  - 76%
Net Income Per Cow  269  112   108                             103  97












Total Receipts  166,780      187,648                    169,122   





    140,046                    118,246 
 
 





    18,327                      21,822 
 
 
% Change From Base Scenario -9% 8%
Net Income Per Cow  269      277                            380   
*Net Income is defined as total receipts minus operating costs minus interest and depreciation. 
Table 6.    Abbreviated Income Statements for the Some Grain Farm, Base and Harkin-Gephardt 
Scenarios, Cases 1 and 2. 
    - - - -- - - -- - - -- - - -- - - -- - - --  Harkin-Gephardt Scenario  - - - -- - - -- - - -- -
Base  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- RFAM ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
Income Statement/Case  Scenario  0%   10% 20%    30%


















  168,317 
 
Operating Costs  164,783  214.718 185,317 157,867  132,369





14,771   18,193 19,663 
 
  19,182
% Change From Base Scenario    26% 56% 68%  64%
Net Income Per Cow  119  151   210 262    302
Case 2 Reduction Scenario 
 
             
Total Receipts  223,790      253,443 229,398     









   
Grain + Concentrate  40,349  49,152 23,185 
Net Income*  1 1 ,455      34,438 39,696     
% Change From Base Scenario    201% 247% 
Net Income Per Cow  119      398 530     
*Net Income is defined as total receipts minus operating costs minus interest and depreciation. Kaiser- Hestop, and Milligan  Income Effects of the Harkin-Gephardt Proposal    81 
Table 7.    Abbreviated Income Statements for the Grain Farm, Base and Harkin-Gephardt 
Scenarios, Cases 1 and 2.  _________________             ____     _______ 
    ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- - H a r k i n - G e ph a r d t  S c e n a r i o   ---- ---- ---- ---
  Base  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  R F A M   -  -  -  - -  --- ---- ---- ---- ----
Income Statement/Case  Scenario  0% 10% 20%    30%
Case 1 Reduction Scenario             
Total Receipts  234,189 294,948 270,039 245,130    220,221
Milk Sales  178,347 226,512 203,861 181,210    158,558
Operating Costs  162,820 195,050 176,506 157,962    139,418





51,768 45,777 39,786 
 
  33,795
% Change From Base Scenario    123% 97% 71%  45%
Net Income Per Cow  339  557 558 559  562




     
 





  272,296 249,645 
 
   
Milk Sales  178,347   203,861 181,210     
Operating Costs  162,820   169,977 145,222 
 
   
Grain +  Concentrate  29,324   41,695 19,502     
Net Income*  23,613   54,563 57,041     
% Change From Base Scenario    131% 142% 
 Net Income Per Cow  339    665 802     
*Net Income is defined as total receipts minus operating costs minus interest and depreciation. 
penses in the base situation. If the Harkin-Gephardt 
Bill were adopted, grain and concentrate costs for 
Forage Only farms would rise to approximately 54% 
of total operating expenses. 
The results of the Forage Only farms reflect the 
precarious position of many of these producers. 
These farms are often located on poor soil which 
makes production of high quality forage difficult and 
grain production nearly impossible. The negative 
effect of the increased cost of the purchased feed is 
much greater than the positive impact of increased 
milk price. It is important to recognize that a high 
proportion of the small dairy farms in New York and 
the Northeast are in this situation. For instance, the 
1982 Agricultural Census reports that 57 percent of 
New York dairy farms did not grow any corn grain in 
1982. The proportion of farms from the 1986 Cornell 
Dairy Farm Business Summary in each of these three 
resource categories supports the Census figures. 
About 53 percent of these farms were classified as 
Forage Only. 
The Some Grain farm was projected to increase its 
income under the HG scenario. In Case 1, the farm 
was better off for all RFAMs with net income under 
the HG scenario ranging from $3,080 to $7,491 
higher than actual 1986 income. Since some New 
York farms in this resource class do have the 
resources to expand grain production Case 1 was
re-estimated assuming that acreage not needed for 
forage could be converted to grain production. In 
this case, income increased marginally by $3,316 at 
the 0% reduction level. For reductions greater than 
0%, the Some Grain farm convened to an All Grain 
farm, and hence the results are not reported. Under 
Case 2 reductions, the Some Grain farm had 
significantly higher income in the HG than the base 
scenario. In this case, net income increased by 195 
and 240 percent for the 10 and 20 percent RFAMs, 
respectively. This result was entirely due to the 
ability to significantly reduce grain costs in Case 2 
assumed management strategies. 
The All Grain farm gained the most from the HG 
Bill because a much smaller quantity of feed was 
purchased. For reduction levels between 0 and 30 
percent, HG net income ranged from 117 to 42 
percent higher than base scenario net income in 
Case 1. In Case 2, HG net income averaged 135 
percent higher than base income for the RFAMs 
considered. The farm was better off under HG be-
cause the increase in grain costs was more than 
offset by an increase in crop and milk receipts. 
The actual RFAM that would be mandated if the 
supply control provisions of the HG proposal were 
implemented would be specific to each farm. Farms 
that have increased marketings relative to their base 
would have to cut back more than farms that have82    October 1987 
not expanded or have actually decreased market-
ings relative to this base. One way to gauge the 
average RFAM is to assume that national data are 
representative of these farms and calculate a mar-
keting base using national data. In 1986, national 
milk marketings totaled 142.8 billion pounds. The 
national Milk Marketing History (i.e., 1981 to 1985 
average marketings with highest and lowest years 
excluded) is 134.3 billions pounds. Consequently, 
the reduction from actual 1986 marketings relative 
to the base would have been 8.5 billion pounds (a 
reduction of 6%) had the Harkin-Gephardt Bill been 
implemented in 1986. In addition, there would also 
be reductions due to decreases in commercial dis-
appearance because of higher retail prices. The study 
by the Agricultural and Food Policy Center proj-
ected that commercial disappearance would fall from 
136.7 billion pounds (milk equivalent) in 1987, 
under the Food Security Act price support level, to 
120.6 billion pounds in 1988, under the Family 
Farm Bill. Assuming this 11.8 percent decrease in 
commercial disappearance for 1986 and exports of 
2.5 billion pounds, these results suggest that the 
Milk Marketing Allocation Factor in 1986 would 
have been 91.7 percent. Using the formula in equa-
tion (1), the national average base in 1986 would 
have been 121.9 billion pounds, compared with 
actual marketings of 142.8 billion pounds. There-
fore, the national average RFAM would have been 
14.6 percent in 1986 had the Harkin-Gephardt supply 
control provisions been implemented. 
At a 14.6 percent RFAM, the Average farm's 
net income in the HG scenario was 59% lower in 
Case 1 and 247% higher in Case 2 than the base 
scenario. The Forage Only farm had a significantly 
lower net income in Case 1 (68 percent lower) and 
just about the same income in Case 2, relative to 
the base scenario at this reduction level. In general, it 
appears that farms in New York that purchase all 
their concentrate would be worse off if the price and 
supply control provisions of the Harkin-Gephardt 
Bill were implemented. Farms falling into the 
Some Grain category are projected to be better off 
at a 14.6 percent cutback relative to income 
influenced by current policy. At this national av-
erage reduction, the Some Grain farm increased its 
income by 64 and 217 percent for Case 1 and 2 
strategies, respectively in the HG scenario. The 
results for the All Grain resource group indicate 
that net incomes would rise if the HG Bill were 
implemented, regardless of the reduction strategy 
followed. Net income for Case 1 and 2 reduction 
strategies at the 14.6 percent reduction level were 
projected to be 80 and 130 percent higher in the 
HG scenario. 
NJARE 
Summary and Implications 
The impact of mandatory supply control and pricing 
provisions incorporated in the Harkin-Gephardt Bill 
would differ depending upon how reductions in 
milk marketing are made as well as on the resource 
endowment of dairy farms. Net benefits of this Bill 
relative to provisions in the 1985 Food Security Act 
would be highly skewed to farms that grow grain 
and farms that can satisfy reduction by reducing 
their herd average production. 
Forage Only producers would be worse off under 
the HG Bill. The net income for this farm in the 
HG scenario was projected to range from 0 to 68 
percent lower than base scenario income at the 
estimated national average reduction level. On the 
other hand, the Some Grain and All Grain farmers 
were consistently better off in the HG scenario. It 
must be remembered that all results assume suc-
cessful reductions in marketings for Case 1 and 2 
strategies. 
The implications of these results for New York 
dairy farmers suggest that the majority of farmers 
would be worse off under provisions of the Harkin-
Gephardt Bill. This is due to the fact that the ma-
jority of New York dairy farmers purchase sub-
stantial quantities of feed (57% according to the 
1982 Agricultural Census). The rise in feed costs 
would more than offset the benefits of higher milk 
prices. 
While the results of a static model make it dif-
ficult to determine how farms would make pro-
duction and marketing adjustments over time if the 
HG Bill were adopted, the inclusion of two reduc-
tion strategies does shed some useful light on the 
matter. The Forage Only and Some Grain farms 
would definitely want to reduce their grain costs by 
either feeding less, or possibly growing more corn 
if the Bill became law. While following the lower 
grain feeding strategy improved net income for the 
Some Grain farms in this study, it was not a 
successful strategy for the Forage Only farms. As a 
result, the Forage Only farms might be long run, as 
well as short run, losers if the HG Bill were adopted. 
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